The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
Evidence of Inaction
This telegram forwards Department of State guidance to the US Mission to the UN in New York instructing US diplomats there that “the international community must give highest priority to full, orderly...
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The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
Evidence of Inaction
This telegram forwards Department of State guidance to the US Mission to the UN in New York instructing US diplomats there that “the international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible.” Advising that this withdrawal does not require a UN Security Council resolution—which would have likely focused international criticism—the Department instructs the mission “that we will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda.” April 15 was the first of two days of UN Security Council debate on next steps in Rwanda—for which the Rwandan ambassador was present and about which he reported back to the interim government in Rwanda. Over that same weekend, aware the UN Security Council was in retreat, the interim Council of Ministers, the genocide’s architects, met in Kigali and decided to take the program of extermination to the rest of the country.
[Moins]